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ABSTRACT 
The growth in Cloud Computing and the ubiquity of Mobile 
devices to access Cloud services has generated a new paradigm, 
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC). While the benefits of storing 
and accessing data in the Cloud are well documented there are 
concerns relating to the security of such data through data 
corruption, theft, exploitation or deletion. Innovative encryption 
schemes have been developed to address the challenges of data 
protection in the Cloud and having greater control over who 
should be accessing what data, one of which is Attribute-Based 
Encryption (ABE). ABE is a type of role-based access control 
encryption solution which allows data owners and data 
consumers or users to encrypt and decrypt based on their 
personal attributes (e.g. department, location, gender, role). A 
number of ABE schemes have been developed over the years but 
ABE in MCC has established its own paradigm driven by a) the 
use of mobile devices to access private data hosted in the Cloud 
and b) the physical limitations of the mobile device to perform 
complex computation in support of encryption and decryption in 
ABE. ABE in MCC is an evolving research field but given the 
breadth and strength of interest at time of writing it is timely to 
perform a survey. Due to the sheer volume of research, the 
survey has focused on one aspect of ABE - Ciphertext-Policy 
Attribute-Based Encryption - in line with its prominence in ABE 
in MCC research to date. Further, given the significant 
developments and interest in IoT, the survey has since been 
extended to assess whether the research into mobile devices has 
been translated to the application of attribute-based encryption 
in IoT where the challenges to support complex computation and 
data transmission are potentially more complex given the much 
greater heterogeneity and resource restrictions of IoT devices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid development of Cloud computing technology 
and services there has been a surge in individuals, groups and 
organisations uploading data into the Cloud for ease of use or 
cost-saving. Included in this data are the highly sensitive and 
there are growing concerns relating to the security and 
privacy of such data. Examples of accidental or intentional 
access to private data by Cloud service provider employees, 
distribution of sensitive data by individuals through accident 
or ignorance as well as 3rd parties with criminal or malicious 
intent to exploit exposure of private data are ever-present in 
today’s digital world. 
The challenges of data security (integrity and 
confidentiality) have been addressed to some extent through 
the adoption of encryption methods for data in situ (on the 
device or Cloud infrastructure) and in transit across the 
network. However, such schemes are limited due to the 
significant overhead of administering encryption keys for a 
multitude of data types, files or documents, to a wide range of 
individuals or groups. One of the key weaknesses of such 
schemes is unauthorised access through collusion. In this 
situation users will be able to share keys to gain access beyond 
their rights. 
In parallel with the growth in Cloud Computing has been the 
extensive use of mobile devices and associated applications to 
access Cloud services, establishing its own paradigm, Mobile 
Cloud Computing (MCC). Such a scenario has generated 
significant research into data security in MCC. In particular, 
there have been a number of recent developments in secure fine-
grained access control systems based on Attribute-based 
encryption (ABE). 
The application of ABE in MCC raises new challenges due to 
ABE’s dependency on complex computation in support of 
encryption and decryption and the physical constraints of 
mobile devices (process, battery, bandwidth). Since 2015 the 
volume of research into ABE in MCC has increased significantly. 
The first part of the survey focuses on Ciphertext-Policy 
ABE (CP-ABE )in MCC primarily due to the fact that most ABE 
schemes in MCC appear to be based on CP-ABE or extensions to 
it. The second part of the paper is to assess the research into the 
application of ABE in IoT and determine whether the schemes 
from CP-ABE in MCC have been translated as potentially 
applicable - either directly or with some minor enhancements - 
to data security in IoT. The approach is to describe the schemes’ 
system architectures using consistent notation and 
terminologies where appropriate and then measure each in 
terms of performance and security. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
ABE was first proposed by Sahai and Waters [1] and was 
considered a promising cryptographic technique in support of 
data confidentiality and access control simultaneously. Its 
emphasis was on Identity-Based Encryption where an identity 
was viewed as a set of attributes. In the paper they stated a 
private key for an identity with attributes w could only decrypt 
a ciphertext encrypted with an identity w’ if and only if the 
identities (i.e. the attributes) sufficiently matched.A crucial 
security aspect of Attribute-Based Encryption is collusion-
resistance: An adversary that holds multiple keys should only be 
able to access data if at least one individual key grants access. 
ABE has now spawned a number of schemes, each of which have 
generated schemes addressing a wide range of access control 
problems. For example, Goyal and Sahai [2] extended the ABE 
scheme to deliver a fine-grained access control system. In their 
scheme each ciphertext is labeled by the encryptor with a set of 
descriptive attributes. Each private key is associated with an 
access structure that specifies which type of ciphertexts the key 
can decrypt. This they defined as Key-Policy Attribute-based 
Encryption (KP-ABE). Bethancourt et al [3] developed an 
alternative ABE scheme, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based 
Encryption (CP-ABE). In their system attributes are used to 
describe a user’s credentials, and a party encrypting data 
determines a policy for who can decrypt. Thus, the methods are 
conceptually closer to traditional access control methods such as 
role-based access control (RBAC). Several ABE schemes have 
developed in recent years. Kumar et al [4] classified ABE as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: ABE Classification (Kumar et al [4]) 
As shown above, there are other examples of ABE but KP-
ABE and CP-ABE have become the most prominent. The 
breadth of research across these areas is wide and increasing 
therefore the survey has aimed to target the ABE scheme 
which is most prominent in Mobile Cloud Computing. 
Research supporting the survey indicates that the ABE in MCC 
is led by CP-ABE. 
A survey of ABE was performed by Qaio et al [5] in 2014 but 
there does not appear to be an equivalent for ABE in MCC. This 
may be due to the fact ABE in MCC is a recent area of research 
and as such researchers are awaiting further developments 
before considering whether a survey at this stage will be of 
value. 
3 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CP-ABE 
Scenario: A Data Owner wishes to share private data with a 
number of Data Users. Assume the data is stored in the Cloud. 
Rather than provide access to the data individually the Data 
Owner will allow Data Users to have access to the data if and 
only if a Data User has the appropriate credentials which in 
this case are the right set of attributes. The Data Owner 
applies an Access Policy to the private data. If the Data User’s 
attributes meet the access policy then the Data User may 
access the data. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: A functional overview of CP-ABE 
CP-ABE meets this requirement by a) the Data Owner 
encapsulating the access policy and data in a single Ciphertext 
and b) the Data User decrypts the ciphertext using their secret 
key if and only if they have the appropriate attributes. The 
implementation of CP-ABE is based on four algorithms: (i) Set-
up (ii) Key Generation, (iii) Encryption, (iv) Decryption ((v) 
Global set-up) 
3.1 The CP-ABE Algorithms 
Notation Description 
DO Data Owner 
DU Data User 
CS Cloud Server 
AA Attribute Authority 
PK Public Key 
MK Master Key 
SK Secret Key 
A Access Set/Access Policy 
AU Attribute Universe 
w Attribute Set 
M Unencrypted Message 
CT Ciphertext of Message 
E/Enc Encryption function 
Table 1: Notation and Terminologies 
An Attribute Universe, AU, is the total set of attributes of a user 
population. In CP-ABE, when a Data Owner, DO, configures an 
access set, A, for his data, M, it is based on the combination of a 
set of attributes taken from the AU. The DO encrypts both the 
message, M and its associated access set, A, through a public key, 
PK. A Data User, DU, is assigned a private key, SK, which is 
associated with his attribute list - also a subset of the AU. The PK 
and SK have both been generated from the same Master Key by 
the AA. The DU can decrypt the message with SK if and only if the 
the attribute list associated with SK meet the criteria of the 
access set for that message. 
 
Figure 3: CP-ABE Implementation 
(1) Setup: The Setup algorithm takes as input a security 
parameter, and returns the public key PK as well as a 
system master secret key MK. PK is used by the DO 
for encryption. The AA will use the MK to generate 
secret keys, SK for the Data Users. The MK is known 
only to the key authority. Setup:{λ}→{MK, PK} 
(2) Encrypt: This algorithm takes as input the PK, a 
plaintext message M, and an access structure A. It 
outputs the ciphertext CT. 
Enc:{PK, MK, A}→ CT 
(3) Key-Generation: This algorithm takes as input a set 
of attributes w, associated with the user and the 
master secret key, MK. It outputs a secret key SK. 
KeyGen:{MK, w}→ SK 
(4) Decrypt: This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext 
CT and a secret key SK for an attribute set. It returns 
the message M if and only if the attribute set satisfies 
the access structure associated with the ciphertext 
CT. 
Dec:{SK, CT}→ M 
4 CP-ABE IN MOBILE CLOUD 
COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE 
4.1 The Challenges of CP-ABE in MCC 
Having described the algorithms which comprise CP-ABE it is 
appropriate to describe the challenges which need to be 
addressed in CP-ABE. 
The three major technical challenges for the end user, the 
DO and the DU, are: 
(1) (DO) Ciphertext Computation Cost: As the access 
policy increases in complexity, the levels of bilinear 
pairing and exponentiation operations also 
increases, resulting in computation costs increasing. 
Such calculations have a major impact on 
performance when executed on mobile and IoT 
devices 
(2) (DO) Ciphertext Communication Cost: As well as the 
computation cost, CP-ABE ciphertext constructions 
are very large as the access policy increases. Sending 
such messages over MCC and IoT bandwidth leads to 
a significant communication cost. 
(3) (DU) Secret Key Computation Cost: The impact of 
decryption of the ciphertext on the recipient mobile 
or IoT device is also a major consideration 
particularly when the size of the ciphertext becomes 
extensive. 
Each of the schemes considered in this review aim to tackle 
these challenges in different ways. 
4.2 Architecture features 
The schemes researched to date have developed different 
architectures to address the problem of resource-constrained 
mobile devices. The following list aims to provide a summary 
of the architectural features which dictate the schemes. Note 
that some schemes may use a combination of these features. 
Architecture features: 
(1) Encryption in the Cloud: ABE encryption is delegated 
from the mobile device to the Cloud server 
(2) Decryption in the Cloud: ABE decryption is delegated 
from the mobile device to the Cloud server 
(3) Pre-encryption: ABE encryption is de-constructed 
into pre-encryption and then encryption to distribute 
computation costs 
(4) Pre-decryption: ABE decryption is de-constructed 
into pre-decryption and then decryption to distribute 
computation costs 
(5) Constant-size ciphertexts: Limiting the computation 
impact of extensive attribute lists defining the access 
policy through constant-size ciphertexts 
(6) Constant-size secret keys: limiting the computation 
impact of extensive attribute sets of individuals 
through constant-size secret keys 
(7) Multiple Authority extension: where the CPABE 
scheme operates across multiple attribute authorities 
which combined support a large scale “universal 
attribute set” 
(8) Online-Offline feature:Where ABE encryption or 
decryption in the scheme is not wholly dependent on 
Cloud services. The Offline feature is where the mobile 
device while not being connected to the internet is able 
to perform higher levels of local complex computation 
while connected to a mains (i.e. during charging). 
4.3 CP-ABE for MCC Capabilities: Scheme 
Assessment Criteria 
(1) Performance: Does the scheme degrade as it scales 
up? Does it deliver fast encryption and/or decryption? 
Are there minimum device configurations or 
requirements? Is the system architecture robust and 
delivers consistent performance? What are the 
computational costs? 
(2) Security: Is the security of the scheme robust or has 
the efficiency of the scheme compromised the level of 
security or access control? 
A note on Revocation: Each scheme was to be assessed on its 
ability to manage revocation of keys. That is to say, does the 
scheme’s design add complexity or simplify key revocation? 
Having reviewed the schemes and CP-ABE generally revocation 
is an inherent problem for such large-scale systems and is a 
research area in its own right. It will therefore not be one of the 
assessment criteria. 
5 CP-ABE SCHEMES IN MCC 
5.1 ABE Encryption and Decryption in the 
Cloud 
To address the challenges of mobile device constraints to 
perform complex encryption and decryption Jin et al [6] have 
proposed a scheme - Secure and Lightweight CP-ABE (SLCP-
ABE). In this scheme the heavy computational tasks are 
outsourced to the Encryption Proxy Server (EPS) and Decryption 
Proxy Server (DPS) located in the Cloud as described in the 
system architecture in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: CP-ABE Encryption and Decryption (Jin et al [6]) 
During running of the Setup algorithm the TA generates the 
PK and MK according to the attribute database. Jin et al 
introduce the addition of a dummy attribute to each user’s 
attribute set. The TA then runs the Keygen algorithm to create 
a user’s secret key, SK, which is associated with her attribute 
set (including the dummy attribute) according to MK. The 
Encryption is then broken down into two levels of encryption 
computation: light (Encryption A) and heavy (Encryption B). 
During Encryption A, Jin et al propose that the Data Owner 
uses the mobile device to generate an intermediate Ciphertext 
CTI which is an encryption of the access tree and the dummy 
attribute and the message based on the private key, PK. The 
DO then sends CTI to the Encryption Proxy Service, EPS. 
Encryption B performs the computationally intensive 
exponentiation associated with the encryption and generates 
a single ciphertext which encapsulates the access set and the 
message and sends to the CSP. During Decryption, the DU 
requests the CT from the CSP. The CSP checks the DU’s 
attribute set meet the access tree. If so, the CSP sends the CT 
to the DPS. Further authentication of the user based on their 
set and supported by SK is performed by the DPS. If successful, 
an intermediate parameter is sent to the DU by the DPS, who 
is then able to run the decryption algorithm to obtain the 
message. 
Performance The concept of moving heavy computation to 
proxy servers is an interesting one and the evidence from 
tests show the significant improvements over mobile devices. 
As with any addition of services and infrastructure to a 
scheme the question of performance degradation relative to 
direct integration between mobile device and CPS needs 
assessment. Jin et al provide evidence of the level of 
performance between the servers and the mobile devices and 
as expected the servers perform extremely well. There is 
however no reference to the impact of sending data over an 
extra hop to get to CSP relative to direct communication 
between mobile and CSP. The argument may be that such a 
discussion is unwarranted since such transmissions do not 
necessarily have to be in real time. As long as the encrypted 
data and its associated access list reach the CSP in an 
acceptable time then this will suffice. If that is the assumption 
then it needs to be made clear. On the Decryption side such an 
argument may not hold. On the one hand the user appreciates 
that the request to gain access has been broken down into two 
transactions and the frustration of mobile device 
performance is removed. On the other hand there is no 
understanding of the impact of relying on 2 services from a 
response time perspective. Additionally, the reliability of the 
architecture may be questioned due to the dependency on 
additional services and servers, EPS and DPS. Operationally, 
the EPS and DPS are likely to be hosted either on premise or 
at another infrastructure CSP. Security Evaluating the security 
analysis by Jin et al, is is very comprehensive in that it covers 
each aspect of data confidentiality, fine-grained access control 
is in line with standard CP-ABE solutions. They also refer to 
user access privilege but even though the Cloud servers can 
obtain subsets of the attribute sets of users there is no risk of 
gaining the full attribute set. What is not clearly explained is 
what risks there are regarding access to a subset of attributes. 
Collusion - the sharing of keys between Data Users to gain 
access to a wider data set - is identified as a core property of 
CP-ABE. 
5.2 On-line/Off-line encryption 
Proposals for online/offline schemes in the field of CP-ABE were 
first submitted by Hohenburger and Waters [7]. The 
computational cost of ABE to perform ciphertext encryption and 
key generation as access policy complexity or number of user 
attributes increased were well understood. Rather than just 
accept poor performance on the device or identify ways of 
moving the computation to servers they proposed a scheme 
where “a mobile device could be programmed to automatically 
do ABE preparation whenever it is plugged into a power source, 
and then when it is unplugged, ABE ciphertexts could be rapidly 
formed with a significant reduction in battery consumption”. The 
concept is similar to the encryption/decryption scheme 
described earlier in that an intermediate ciphertext is created on 
the mobile device but the extent of its encryption is greater when 
the device is working offline and then directly sends to the CSP 
when on-line. In [7] Hohenburger and Waters focused on the 
Encryption phase and in particular the “preparation phase” 
performed on the mobile device offline, a significant amount of 
the work to encrypt the message OR create a key before it knows 
the access control policy. Once the details of the access policy are 
known then the ABE ciphertext can be rapidly constructed. As 
can be seen in the following schemes Online/Offline has been 
adopted into wider schemes such as Pre-decryption and Pre-
encryption as well as multiauthority schemes. 
5.3 Pre-encryption and Pre-decryption and 
Anonymous CP-ABE 
One of the concerns relating to ABE is the set of attributes may 
help determine who is the target receiver which exposes the 
user’s privacy. By knowing the user’s identity it may be 
possible to know the nature of the plaintext. To tackle this 
problem anonymous ABE schemes have developed over the 
years. In anonymous CP-ABE the recipient aims to decrypt 
using the secret key with the appropriate attribute set for that 
access policy. The problem arises when the user is rejected 
because he has supplied the wrong key. Under anonymous CP-
ABE, Zhang et al [8] identified that one of the major problems 
for users was not knowing which key should be used during 
decryption and a user may have several keys (for different 
messages and access policies) and keep trying before 
succeeding. In MCC this puts a significant overhead on the the 
mobile device. Their scheme introduced a new technique 
called “match-then-decrypt”. In such a scheme special 
components of the ciphertext are used to test the access policy 
against the attributes in the private key without performing 
decryption. If there is a match then decryption will take place. 
Zhang et al[9] have recently proposed a scheme to improve 
the encryption process for anonymous CP-ABE by 
“introducing a match-then-re-encrypt technique which they 
call CP-ABPRE (see Figure 5 for the system architecture). 
 
Figure 5: Proxy re-encryption and Anon. CP-ABE (Zhang et al 
[9]) 
Similar to the aforementioned match-then-decrypt technique, 
“this technique works by computing special components in 
proxy re-encryption keys and ciphertexts which are used to 
check whether the proxy can fulfill a proxy re-encryption or 
not”. On successful re-encryption the scheme extends to the 
match-then-decrypt technique to offer an all-round 
preencryption, pre-decryption solution. 
Performance In Figures 6 and 7 Zhang et al [9] provide evidence 
to show the improvements made by pre-decryption and pre-
encryption. 
 Figure 6: Decryption cost for anonymous CPABPRE. (Zhang 
et al [9]) 
Performance In Figures 6 and 7 below Zhang et al provide 
evidence to show the improvements made by pre-decryption. 
This is supplemented in the later paper on re-encryption. 
 
Figure 7: Re-encryption cost for anonymous CPABPRE. 
(Zhang et al [9]) 
5.4 Constant-size ciphertexts and Constant-
size secret keys 
As has been stated, computational complexity and costs to 
encrypt and decrypt the ciphertext puts significant burden on 
the mobile device of the data owner and data user 
respectively. While there are significant developments in the 
areas of pre-encryption, outsourcing of encryption and 
decryption to reduce the impact on the devices, Chen et al [10] 
developed a scheme to limit the level of computation 
irrespective of the access structure complexity. Zhang et al 
[11] have extended Chen et al’s scheme to deliver small 
computation costs and constant-size ciphertexts. 
Another challenge is the computation of secret keys. The 
size of secret keys can also be extended as the size of the Data 
User’s attribute list increases. As users access a wider range of 
services their attribute list increases to meet the 
requirements of a wider range of access policies. This will put 
increasing demands on the mobile device to decrypt. Guo et al 
[12] proposed a CP-ABE scheme with constant-size secret 
keys. In the scheme Guo et al make two major contributions in 
their paper. The first is to deliver a constant-size Security Key 
irrespective of the size of attribute list but the other is to apply 
this to very lightweight devices as the decryption key can be a 
small as 672-bits. Its applications are potentially wide-
ranging. 
Odelu et al [13] have recently taken the discussion further in 
delivering a scheme which delivers both constant-size 
ciphertexts and security keys. identified that while both 
improved the efficiency of encryption and decryption and 
potentially offered improvements to the 
Performance The benefits of constant-size ciphertexts and 
secret keys are obvious. Any schemes which limit the impact 
on a mobile device’s performance to encrypt or decrypt 
irrespective of the complexity of the access policy or size of 
the attribute list are a useful addition to the portfolio of 
options. As data owners share more of their data to a wider 
audience or users wish to access more services and data 
sources such schemes will ensure performance is not 
hindered. Odelu et al do provide evidence of the performance 
improvement in the their scheme over others based on the 
sizes of the security key and the ciphertext generated. The 
sizing is based on pairing groups and length of plaintext. At 
this point in time it is beyond this author’s knowledge to 
understand how the scheme compares relative to others in 
the table provided by Odelu et al. Suffice to say that based on 
the variables provided the scheme delivers constant-size 
ciphertexts and secret keys at sizes which are of lower order 
than other schemes (multiples of bilinear group or plaintext 
message size) 
5.5 Multi-Authority Extensions 
The schemes discussed in this survey thus far are based to a 
large extent on a single Attribute Authority in the assignment 
of keys in support of access policies of the data owner or the 
attribute set of the data user. One of the biggest concerns with 
standard ABE schemes is the exposure of risk to of a single 
attribute authority. The AA has full visibility of access 
structures and attribute lists. If the attributes were 
distributed across multiple authorities then the risk is 
somewhat reduced. Furthermore, thee is a recognition that in 
“real world” conditions the likelihood is that multiple 
authorities may participate in the maintenance and 
distribution of such keys. In order for this to operate 
effectively then additional services are required to minimise 
the Data Owner and Data User being inundated with a number 
of keys to maintain the appropriate level of security. It is 
worthwhile explaining the concept of Multi-authority 
schemes. In such a scheme assume there are multiple 
attribute authorities each of which has its own attribute 
universe for a group of users. The Data Owner is aware that 
no single authority is able to support their access policy as the 
AA will only generate keys for a subset of such attributes. In 
order for the AA’s to operate effectively additional parties are 
added to the implementation of the scheme to maintain 
unique identities and keys which “unify” the local private keys 
and secret keys from the individual Attribute Authorities. At 
one time proposed multi-authority ABE schemes had been 
limited by the fact that once the PK had been set up then there 
was no flexibility in the schemes to accommodate access 
structure or attribute changes. Li et al [14] proposed a 
provable secure unbounded multi-authority CPABE scheme. 
The standard CP-ABE scheme is extended to accommodate 
Global service providers. The Global Set-up algorithm 
generates Global PK’s - effectively managing the uniqueness 
of ALL users in the system. A Central Authority then generates 
its own MK and PK (similar to a single authority schemes 
described earlier) using the Global PK as input. The AA’s 
meanwhile, which individually support a subset of the 
attribute set supporting the system, generate their own MK, 
PK and SK for the attributes they support. It is the role of the 
CA to generate identity keys which links all the attribute keys 
to a user’s GID. It is this unique key which drives the 
encryption and decryption process. 
 
Figure 8: Multi-authority CP-ABE (Li et al [14]) 
Zhang et al[15] have extended Li’s solution by introducing 
Offline-Online attribute-based encryption. In this scheme the 
secret key generation and encryption are both performed off-
line. The recommendation is that “the Global Identity and 
Attribute Authorities can each issue secret keys before knowing 
the GID and attributes. The DO can perform encryption 
computation before knowing the the actual message or and 
access structure”. 
The system architecture of Zhang et al’s is shown below. 
 
Figure 9: System architecture of online/offline multi-
authority attribute-based data sharing system (Zhang et 
al [15]) 
Performance Looking at the evidence from Zhang’s paper it is 
clear that there are significant improvements to be gained 
when applying online/offline techniques to Li’s original 
scheme (see Figure 2 in Zhang et al[15] - Online computation 
cost comparisons between fully large universe constructions). 
Where this diverges from other online/offline schemes is that 
it brings into play the service providers (Global and Attribute 
Authorities) operating offline. However, if the multi-authority 
model is the way forward then it will be incumbent on these 
organisations to offer the optimum service. One major 
concern is the operational aspect of multiple authorities 
supporting the system. Although the authorities operate 
independently in this scheme the more participants 
supporting such a scheme the grater the risk in potential 
failures in the system. 
Security Although there are a number of actors throughout the 
scheme the primary objective of multi-authority schemes is to 
address security by ensuring no single Attribute Authority 
holds all the information relating to access policies or 
attributes. 
6 THE APPLICATION OF CP-ABE TO THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS 
Following the survey of CP-ABE in MCC the paper has been 
extended to identify whether such schemes have generated 
further research in their application to “lighter” devices in the 
IoT. The following schemes are some of those identified to date. 
Yao et al. [16] propose a lightweight ABE scheme for IoT 
which is based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECDDH) for 
security rather than bilinear pairing to improve efficiency and 
reduce the computational and communication overhead. 
Evaluating its performance against other schemes - both KPABE 
and CP-ABE - the computation improvements are significant. 
The authors highlight the limitations of the scheme in terms of: 
inflexibility of attribute revocation - a generic problem with most 
ABE schemes - but there will be future work to investigate this; 
poor scalability in that as as attributes are increased the 
computational and communication overhead increases linearly - 
similar to a number of ABE schemes unless adopting constant-
size ciphertext and secret key solutions; poor generality in that 
the scheme has been tested against Unit IoT (single authority or 
domain application) rather than ubiquitous IoT (cross domain). 
Further research into both its scalability and generality are 
required. 
The scheme proposed by Touati et al [18] - Cooperative CP 
ABE (C-CB-ABE) - aligns with some of the schemes from MCC 
based on the principle of delegating the heavy computation and 
communication to more powerful devices which Touati et al 
refer to as “assisting nodes”. 
Evaluating the performance, Touati et al confirm that the 
actual computation is exactly the same but by distributing it to 
the more powerful assistant nodes performance significantly 
improves. The communication cost in terms of energy expended 
to send from to the assistant nodes is less than the energy saved 
in delegating the computation. 
The scheme is also secure in that all communication between 
the device and assistant node is secure. Further, the storage 
server is unable to recover the original message due to the 
partial encryption performed across the device and node. 
Recommendations on the number of assistant nodes is 
provided (n = 5) which will gain thew correct balance between 
robustness and efficiency. [Further information providing a 
simple formula to calculate the optimum assistant node 
configuration based on number of devices, complexity of 
encryption and frequency of encryption (transmissions between 
device and node) would be useful]. 
As well as Co-operative CP-ABE Touati et al [20] propose a 
scheme to enhance the efficiency of CP-ABE Attribute and Key 
management. It is recognised that attribute revocation is a 
general problem in CP-ABE due to the nature of regenerating a 
significant number of keys and/or re-assignment of attributes to 
all users. Given the heterogeneity of devices, the volume of 
devices and the breadth of applications and the rate at which 
such factors are increasing then revocation could become a 
major concern in the adoption and application of CP-ABE to IoT. 
In their paper, Touati et al base their scheme on the premise 
that attributes are known in advance and that the response to 
change can be managed by a combination of good planning 
and the application of time periods when the attribute/s 
is/are valid. They reason that for large institutions such as 
health and education then such planning is perfectly feasible. 
This then means the keys associated with a user’s attributes 
no longer need to be re-issued in response to change but 
instead the decryption algorithm checks the validity of the 
attribute based on time. 
It is clear that such a scheme could be beneficial under the 
appropriate conditions that is, not only in terms of low 
volatility but in the planning of how such change is applied in 
advance with the attribute authority. Applying this to a wider 
context such as Multi-Authority, will be more complex but 
more at the administrative level as opposed to technical. The 
survey thus far has focused on individual schemes which aim 
to overcome the challenges of ABE - and, in particular, CP-ABE 
- due to the limitations of Mobile and IoT devices. Though not 
a specific scheme, Ambrosin et al [21] have performed a study 
of ABE on IoT devices building on their similar investigation 
into the feasibility of ABE on Smartphone devices [22]. The 
paper provides a summary of performance (execution time), 
memory and energy consumption in relation to processor 
(intel and Raspberry Pi), number of attributes and levels of 
encryption (80-, 112- and 128-bit). The paper also provides 
an application example in healthcare for the collation of data 
from a number of sensors generating ECG data and securely 
sending to a central server. 
The conclusions from the paper are that with appropriate 
memory management, customised data structure deployment 
and simplified cryptographic arithmetic operations there is 
strong potential in ABE (both KP- and CP-) in its application to 
IoT. Further, the complex arithmetic operations could 
potentially move to hardware accelerators which to some 
extent aligns neatly with C-CP-ABE referenced above. 
7 FINDINGS 
In recent years there has been significant growth in the 
adoption of mobile devices, mobile applications and Cloud 
services and this is likely to continue for a number of years. 
Their adoption has resulted in the increasing risk of exposure 
of data in various sectors spanning personal (health, financial, 
social), corporate (intellectual property, financial, 
commercial) and public (e.g. health services, education, crime 
prevention). CP-ABE has been identified as one approach to 
addressing some of the challenges of data security on Mobile 
devices and Mobile Cloud Computing generally. 
Based on the research reviewed in this survey, the 
general view is that the computational demands of CP-
ABE encryption and decryption is inefficient on Mobile 
devices due to their physical limitations: processor and 
battery power as well as network bandwidth. To address 
these constraints several creative schemes have been 
proposed. 
(1) Developments in more efficient attribute-based 
encryption algorithms will reduce the levels of 
computation which has the potential of making it 
more ubiquitous across a wider range of devices. 
(2) The distribution of computation across mobile 
devices and dedicated encryption-decryption proxy 
servers offers further potential but this brings with 
it a more complex operating model spanning 
device-encryption proxy server-host architecture. 
(3) The Offline-Online architecture also provides 
opportunities but this must be weighed against the 
impact of encryption/decryption being a two-phase 
and not real-time transaction. 
(4) Fixed-size ciphertext and security key schemes are 
a move towards computation optimisation such 
that increasing levels of complexity in access rules 
or attributes will have minimal impact on 
encryption/decryption computation. 
(5) Most schemes are based on the single attribute-
authority scenario. In reality there may be several 
attribute authorities and proposed schemes are 
evolving in this area. The challenge will be the 
operational aspect of coordinating a multitude of 
attribute authorities. 
A review of the application of attribute-based encryption 
schemes to IoT suggest that it is developing its own 
paradigm and that there is little that has been translated 
from the CPABE in MCC to IoT. The key findings are as 
follows: 
(1) Increasing the efficiency and reducing the 
complexity of encryption-generated 
computation will be a significant benefit in IoT 
but such schemes used for MCC do not appear to 
be transferable to IoT at this stage and IoT may 
have to develop its own schemes such as the one 
developed by Yao et al. 
(2) Delegation of encryption to trusted “assistant 
nodes” which exist on the same network as the 
IoT device but are able to perform heavier 
computation and data transmissions. Similar to 
the proxy servers identified in the MCC schemes 
it is assumed their operational management will 
be significantly simpler being on the same local 
network as the IoT devices. Potential 
performance and scalability benefits are 
envisaged. If assistant nodes could also operate 
as surrogate firewalls then security benefits may 
also be realised but this will need to be weighed 
against the impact on performance. 
(3) The research into performance of lightweight 
devices by Ambrosin et al is an area which 
appears to be growing generally. Their findings 
suggest that lightweight devices could 
potentially support CP-ABE however further 
investigation into memory, processor, battery 
and network capacities is required. Such 
research could be consolidated to develop a 
model of device sizing against computation 
(encryption at bit and attribute level) and 
performance. More empirical evidence of CP-
ABE across a wider range of IoT devices using 
the methodology described would be of great 
value. 
8 CONCLUSION 
CP-ABE is an extremely useful scheme to address the risks 
associated with data security in the Cloud. It provides a certain 
level of flexibility and scalability in that it removes the need for 
data owners to manage every individual request. Instead, the 
data owner maintains an access policy and if the user has the 
appropriate attributes then she will gain access. This survey’s 
objectives were to describe how the inherent computation 
complexity and communication costs of CP-ABE are a major 
concern in MCC and IoT and may hinder its adoption. The survey 
has also identified that there are a number of creative schemes 
to address these concerns including offline/online algorithms, 
computation delegation through proxy server processing, 
computationand communication-limiting schemes using 
constantsize ciphertexts and security keys and risk-
management and scalable solutions identified in multi-authority 
schemes. 
CP-ABE in MCC is still a relatively new area of research and 
it is likely to grow significantly in line with the growth in MCC 
and users wanting access to increasing amounts of data and 
services on the one hand and on the other the increasing 
concerns of individuals, groups, corporations and 
governments regarding the security of their private data. 
The application of ABE, and CP-ABE in particular, to IoT is 
generating its own paradigm. While some research in this area 
is based on previous mobile device research (Ambrosin et al) 
there does not appear to be a significant amount from Mobile 
device schemes being applied to the IoT at this stage. There is 
general consensus that computation needs to be more 
efficient on the one hand and hardware and network 
improvements on the other to see real benefits in IoT. 
Further investigation into the application of ABE (in 
particular, CP-ABE) to IoT is needed. This should be added to 
a knowledge base of findings such that a set of 
recommendations on device sizing against levels of 
computation and performance can be established. The 
recommendations should also consider architecture options 
such as proxy devices or assistant nodes to accommodate the 
heavier computation as well as act as security gateways to 
limit or prevent direct communication between the IoT device 
and the internet. 
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